AI Bibliography

AS the U.S. Army moves forward in its efforts to transform itself in profound ways, it might be useful for its leadership to reexamine the origins of some concepts that serve as the theoretical underpinnings of current Army and joint doctrine. Among those that should be closely recon- sidered is “center of gravity” (COG), a concept widely attributed to Carl von Clausewitz and now regarded as the heart of any sound plan for a campaign or major operation.1 even a cursory glance at the military literature of the last 30 years, starting with core doctrinal documents produced by the Army itself, reveals how pervasive and essential the COG concept has become in U.S. operational thinking. massive amounts of time, energy, ink, and paper have been expended on defining, analyzing, and arguing how the concept should be properly applied within the context of a supposed Clausewitzian paradigm of war. Unfortunately, the major problem with this, at least from a historical perspective, is that Clausewitz never used the term “center of gravity.” Furthermore, he might not have agreed entirely with what that concept now denotes in the American military lexicon.

the term from which the COG concept has been extrapolated, Schwerpunkt, really means “weight (or focus) of effort.” In reassessing center of gravity as an underpinning of doctrine, it is important to observe that the original Schwer- punkt concept is actually closer in meaning to what the U.S. military now calls the “sector of main effort” and the “point of main attack” (defense). Although the original Clausewitzian rendering of Schwerpunkt could, like the COG, encom- pass both physical and human elements, it is less complicated to identify, but not necessarily to apply, than the U.S. concept of a COG or COGs. In contrast to the modern application of the concept of center of gravity, Clausewitz’s Schwerpunkt dealt almost exclusively with the strategic level of war.

the purpose of this essay is to trace the development of the Schwerpunkt concept as the Germans understood and employed it (in a manner probably more congruous with Clausewitz’s intent) from Field marshal Alfred von Schlieffen’s time as chief of the German general staff, through the interwar years, to World War II. We can then compare the German interpretation with its American counterpart to examine the validity of the current U.S. concept of center of gravity. Our investigation will perhaps offer a related but significantly different alternative to the modern COG concept, one that we might use to focus planning for future campaigns or major operations.