AI Strategy and Concepts Bibliography

The study was tasked to examine both offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) needs and opportunities over the next two decades. The incentive for the investigation was a concern that while the U.S. is ever more dependent on the use of electronics to carry out operations, adversaries might use EW methods to challenge that use.

During the initial phase of the investigation, the study met with government agencies, military departments, laboratory researchers, and industry representatives. All offered a consistent theme that the U.S. was drifting into a decidedly lagging position in EW.

Early in the process, USD(AT&L) requested that the study provide some specific program needs and opportunities. In response, the study investigated EW in four operational support capabilities—satellite communications; tactical communications; precision navigation; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and also looked at three representative mission areas—tactical air combat, fleet defense, and ground force operations. Serious deficiencies were found in all seven areas. Worse, the study believes that such deficiencies are common to most military operational regimes.

Success in past conflicts has relied on information superiority on the field of conflict; this information superiority has been largely dependent on widespread use of modern sensor and communications electronics hardware and software. Unfortunately, that superiority in electronics is now severely challenged and a substantial set of initiatives is needed to regain the advantage.

The study finds the current position to be a consequence of three major factors. First is twenty-five years of EW neglect after the end of the Cold War. A perception that the threat had disappeared as well caused U.S. attention to EW to relax. Second is the worldwide migration of sophisticated electronics capabilities in hardware, software, and software-driven system architectures. As a result, the U.S. is no longer the overwhelming leader in these technologies. Finally, it has become clear that potential adversaries who have observed U.S. battlefield electronics dominance in action are taking carefully orchestrated and well-funded steps to undo that advantage.